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Abstract 
This paper explores biases in the elicitation of utilities under risk and the contribution that 
generalizations of expected utility can make to the resolution of these biases. We used five 
methods to measure utilities under risk and found clear violations of expected utility. Of the 
theories studies, prospect theory was most consistent with our data. The main improvement of 
prospect theory over expected utility was in comparisons between a riskless and a risky prospect 
(riskless-risk methods). We observed no improvement over expected utility in comparisons 
between two risky prospects (risk-risk methods). An explanation why we found no improvement 
of prospect theory over expected utility in risk-risk methods may be that there was less 
overweighting of small probabilities in our study than has commonly been observed. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores biases in the elicitation of utilities under risk and the contribution that 
generalizations of expected utility make to the resolution of these biases. Risky utilities are 
widely used in decision analysis. The main examples are the probability equivalence (PE) 
method, where people are asked to state a probability in a risky prospect that makes them 
indifferent between this risky prospect and a given outcome for sure, and the certainty 
equivalence (CE) method, where people are asked to state an outcome for sure that makes them 
indifferent between this outcome and a given risky prospect. The appealing feature of using 
methods involving risk is that they allow to incorporate people’s attitudes towards risk into 
decision analysis.  
The common way to analyze the responses to utility measurements under risk is by 
assuming expected utility. A rationale for adopting expected utility is that decision analysis is 
essentially a prescriptive exercise and that expected utility is the dominant prescriptive theory of 
decision under risk. The problem with this point of view is that in most practical applications 
measuring utilities is a descriptive task, and the descriptive deficiencies of expected utility are 
widely documented (Starmer 2000). Using expected utility to analyze responses to utility 
measurement tasks in spite of its poor descriptive record carries the danger that biased utilities 
result and that decision analyses based on these biased utilities make incorrect recommendations.  
In fact, several studies have shown that utility measurement based on expected utility leads to 
inconsistencies.  Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) showed that PE  measurements lead to 
systematically higher utilities than CE measurements. McCord and de Neufville (1986) found that 
the utility function that is elicited by the CE method depends on the value at which probability is 
kept fixed. In the health domain, several authors have shown that different procedures to elicit 
utilities by the PE method that according to expected utility are equivalent lead to systematically 
different results (Llewellyn-Thomas et al. 1982, Rutten-van Mölken et al. 1995, Bleichrodt 2001, 
Oliver 2003).   3
A solution for the observed inconsistencies was suggested by Bleichrodt et al. (2001). 
They argued that people’s preferences are affected by biases. The biases they considered were 
probability weighting, the nonlinear evaluation of probabilities, and loss aversion, the finding that 
people are more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same size. Both biases have been modeled 
by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992), currently the 
main descriptive theory of decision under risk. Bleichrodt et al. proposed new formulas based on 
prospect theory to evaluate answers to PE and CE measurements and showed that these new 
formulas were able to resolve the systematic discrepancy between PE and CE utilities.  
It is not clear whether the findings of Bleichrodt et al. (2001) can be extended to other 
methods than the PE and the CE. The PE and CE are examples of methods in which a riskless 
prospect is compared with a risky prospect (riskless-risk methods). Several empirical studies have 
observed that violations of expected utility primarily occur when one of the prospects under 
consideration is riskless; expected utility’s descriptive record is much better when both prospects 
are risky (Conlisk 1989, Camerer 1992, Harless and Camerer 1994, Wu and Gonzalez 1996, 
Starmer 2000). Hence, it is of interest to examine the performance of prospect theory when we 
include methods that compare two risky prospects (risk-risk methods). It would be important for 
practical decision analysis in case we observed that expected utility could explain the data from 
risk-risk measurements. Instead of having to elicit probability weighting and loss aversion 
parameters, which is time consuming, preferences could then be measured under expected utility 
by using lottery equivalence methods (McCord and de Neufville 1986).  
The purpose of this paper is to present more extensive data on inconsistencies in 
measuring utilities under risk. We compared five elicitation methods, three riskless-risk methods 
and two risk-risk methods. We evaluated these five methods under expected utility and under 
several generalizations of expected utility. The generalizations we considered were prospect 
theory, rank-dependent utility (Quiggin 1981), disappointment aversion (Gul 1991), and two 
recently proposed gambling effect models (Bleichrodt and Schmidt 2002, Diecidue et al. 2004).   4
An interesting feature of the gambling effect models is that they predict that expected utility will 
lead to consistent measurements in risk-risk methods.  
We studied the performance of these theories in the health domain. The main reason we 
focused on health is practical relevance. Health is an important area of applied decision analysis 
(the majority of applied decision analyses are in the health domain, see Keller and Kleinmuntz 
1998 and Smith and von Winterfeldt 2004) and risky methods are widely used in medical 
decision analysis. Of the theories we examined, prospect theory was most consistent with the 
data. The main improvement of prospect theory over expected utility was in riskless-risk 
methods. For risk-risk methods we found no violations both for expected utility and for prospect 
theory and, hence, prospect theory did not improve over expected utility.  
In what follows, Section 2 introduces notation and describes the nonexpected utility 
theories studied in this paper. Section 3 describes the five elicitation methods used. Section 4 
analyzes the predicted deviations from expected utility and shows how utilities were computed 
under the theories considered. Section 5 describes the experiment that we performed and Section 
6 its results. Section 7 discusses the main findings, implications, and limitations of our study and 
concludes the paper. Derivations are in the appendix. 
 
2. Notation and outline of the models 
  We study preferences over chronic health states. Chronic health states will be written as 
(Q,T), denoting T years in health state Q. Because the experiment reported later only invokes 
prospects with at most two different chronic health states, we will restrict the analysis to such 
binary prospects. Let (p:(Q1,T1); (Q2,T2)) denote the prospect that gives outcome (Q1,T1) with 
probability p and outcome (Q2,T2) with probability 1−p. A prospect is riskless if p = 1; otherwise 
it is risky. 
  Preferences over prospects are denoted as usual: the relation í denotes weak preference, 
ê denotes strict preference, and ~ denotes indifference. Preferences over outcomes correspond   5
with preferences over riskless prospects. We assume throughout that prospects are rank-ordered, 
i.e. it is implicit in the notation (p:(Q1,T1); (Q2,T2)) that (Q1,T1) í (Q2,T2). Expected utility holds if 
there exists a function U from the set of chronic health states to the real numbers, called the utility 
function, such that prospects (p:(Q1,T1); (Q2,T2)) are evaluated by pU(Q1,T1) + (1−p)U(Q2,T2) and 
preferences and choices correspond with this evaluation. 
The gambling effect models of Bleichrodt and Schmidt (2002) and Diecidue et al. (2004) 
deviate from expected utility by assuming that there is not one utility function over outcomes but 
two. In the model of Diecidue et al. (2004) preferences are prospect-dependent: if a prospect is 
risky its outcomes are evaluated by a utility function U, if it is riskless its outcomes are evaluated 
by a utility function V. Diecidue et al. (2004) assume that V(⋅) = U(⋅) + C(⋅), where the function C 
denotes the benefit of certainty. To account for the commonly observed violations of expected 
utility, C must be positive for all outcomes.  
In the model of Bleichrodt and Schmidt (2002) preferences are context-dependent: when 
both prospects in a comparison are risky its outcomes are evaluated by a utility function U, 
otherwise the outcomes of both prospects are evaluated by a utility function V. To account for the 
commonly observed violations of expected utility, U is assumed to be less concave than V. To 
illustrate the difference between the model of Diecidue et al. (2004) and that of Bleichrodt and 
Schmidt (2002) consider the indifference between the riskless prospect (Q2,T2) and the risky 
prospect (p,(Q1,T1); (Q2,T2)), p∈(0,1). According to the model of Diecidue et al. (2004) this 
indifference implies that 
 
V(Q2,T2) = pU(Q1,T1) + (1−p)U(Q3,T3),      (1) 
 
whereas according to the model of Bleichrodt and Schmidt (2002) this indifference implies that  
   6
V(Q2,T2) = pV(Q1,T1) + (1−p)V(Q3,T3).      (2) 
 
2.1. Prospect theory, Rank-Dependent Utility, and Disappointment Aversion 
Prospect theory deviates in three important respects from expected utility. First, carriers 
of value are gains and losses relative to a reference point. The location of the reference point is 
exogenously given and is not specified by prospect theory. We will denote the reference point as 
(Q0,T0). In the formal analysis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where there is only one fixed 
reference point, the reference point is assigned utility zero. In this paper we will consider 
variations in the reference point and, hence, we do not follow this convention. A second deviation 
from expected utility is that people do not evaluate probabilities linearly, but weight probabilities; 
probability weighting for gains can be different from probability weighting for losses. Third, 
people are more sensitive to losses than to absolutely commensurate gains, a phenomenon known 
as loss aversion. 
We will say that a prospect is mixed if it involves both a gain and a loss. A mixed 
prospect ((Q1,T1), p, (Q2,T2)), (Q1,T1) í (Q0,T0) í (Q2,T2), is evaluated as  
 
PT((Q1,T1), p, (Q2,T2)) = U(Q0,T0) + w
+(p)(U(Q1,T1) − U(Q0,T0))      
          −λ w




− are the probability weighting functions for gains and losses and λ is a loss 
aversion parameter. The probability weighting functions assign 0 to 0 and 1 tot 1 and are strictly 
increasing. We separate loss aversion from utility, because we will consider varying reference 
points and we want to establish a link with expected utility. Therefore, the utility function U 
reflects the intrinsic utility of chronic health states. Our method for modeling loss aversion is 
similar to Shalev (2000). In studies where the reference point is held fixed, loss aversion is often   7
incorporated in the utility function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
In Eq.(3), outcomes are evaluated as deviations from the reference point through terms U(Q1,T1) 
− U(Q0,T0) so as to combine the psychology of prospect theory with the utility function U of 
expected utility. 
  If both outcomes are gains, (Q1,T1) í (Q2,T2) í (Q0,T0), then 
 
PT((Q1,T1), p, (Q2,T2)) = U(Q0,T0) + w
+(p)(U(Q1,T1) − U(Q0,T0))      
          + (1−w
+(p))(U(Q2,T2) − U(Q0,T0)).        (4) 
 




1+(1−p)δ , Eq.(4) is equivalent to Gul’s (1991) theory of disappointment 
aversion. The parameter δ∈(−1,∞) reflects disappointment aversion. 
If both outcomes are losses (Q0,T0) í (Q1,T1) í (Q2,T2), then 
 
PT((Q1,T1), p, (Q2,T2)) = U(Q0,T0) −λw
−(1−p)(U(Q0,T0) − U(Q2,T2))    
  
          − λ(1−w
−(1−p))(U(Q0,T0) − U(Q1,T1)).        (5) 
 
  We assume throughout that changes in the reference point leave the probability weighting 
functions w
+ and w
−, the utility function U, and the loss aversion parameter λ unchanged. 
Empirical studies have shown that the most common pattern for the probability weighting 
function is inverse S-shaped, overweighting small probabilities and underweighting intermediate 
and large probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Tversky and Fox 1995, Gonzalez and Wu 
1999, Abdellaoui 2000, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000). Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed the 








1/γ  ,        (6) 
 
which has an inverse S-shape for γ between 0.27 and 1. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) found a 
median value for γ
+ (the parameter for gains) of 0.61 and for γ
− (the parameter for losses) of 0.69. 
Later studies found comparable values for γ
+ and γ
−. These values imply that the probability for 
which the probability weighting functions change from overweighting probabilities to 
underweighting probabilities, i.e. the probability for which w(p) = p, lies between 0.30 and 0.40. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also estimated the loss aversion coefficient and found a median 
value for λ equal to 2.25. Bleichrodt et al. (2001), who used the same definition of loss aversion 
as Tversky and Kahneman (1992) found a comparable value for λ. 
 
3. Elicitation methods 
  Table 1 shows the elicitation methods that were used; the response that was elicited is 
printed in bold. 
 
Table 1: The Five Elicitation Methods 
Method Question 
Probability Equivalence (PE)  (Q,T) ~ (p′:(FH,T); Death) 
Certainty Equivalence (CE)  (Q,Tce) ~ (p′:(FH,T); Death) 
Value Equivalence (VE)  (Q,T) ~ (p′:(FH,Tve); Death) 
Probability Lottery Equivalence 
(PLE) 
(0.35:(Q,T); Death) ~ (r′:(FH,T); Death) 
Value Lottery Equivalence (VLE)  (0.35:(Q,T); Death) ~ (0.35:(FH,Tvle); Death) 
Note: FH stands for “full health”. 
   9
To enhance comparability between the riskless-risk methods, the selected value of the 
gauge duration T was the same in all five methods and the response p′ elicited in the PE method 
was also used in the CE and the VE method. The use of  probability 0.35, for which previous 
studies observed little probability distortion, in the risk-risk methods does not mean that 
probability weighting plays no role in these methods as r′ would generally be lower than 0.35.  
 
4. Predictions 
  We assumed throughout that people prefer more life duration to less, both in full health 
and in health state Q. Then expected utility, rank-dependent utility, disappointment aversion, and 
the gambling effect models predict that, except for random error, we should observe that  T = Tce 
= Tve.
1 The two risk-risk methods could not be directly compared with each other and with the 
riskless-risk methods because they involved different probabilities. 
  The predictions made by prospect theory depend on the location of the reference point. 
Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) and Bleichrodt et al (2001) argued that in a utility elicitation 
task in which a subject compares two prospects and has to determine a parameter (either a 
probability or an outcome) that makes him indifferent between the two prospects, he will take an 
outcome of the prospect which parameters do not change as his reference point. Their argument is 
corroborated by empirical evidence (Stalmeier and Bezembinder 1999, Morrison 2000, 
Bleichrodt et al., 2001, Robinson et al. 2001). In the PE and in the VE this implies that the 
reference point is (Q,T). In the CE the reference point is either (FH,T) or Death. The data in 
Bleichrodt et al. (2001) suggest that people took death as their reference point in the CE 
questions. Under the above hypotheses we would expect that T  = Tve. However, under prospect 
theory Tce may well differ from T. Under the aforementioned hypotheses, the PE and VE method 
                                                 
1 This follows from transitivity and the assumption that more life duration is preferred to less. Bleichrodt 
and Schmidt’s (2002) model satisfies transitivity for riskless-risk methods, even though it does not satisfy 
transitivity in general.   10
compare mixed prospects, whereas the CE compares either two prospects involving only gains or 
two prospects involving only losses. It is well-known that people are more risk averse for mixed 
prospects and, hence, we expect Tce > T. Again, because the risk-risk methods used different 
probabilities they do not yield specific predictions unless additional assumptions were made. 
  To be able to compute health state utilities we assumed in all models multiplicativity of 
U: U(Q,T) = H(Q)L(T) where H and L are real-valued utility functions over the set of health 
states and the set of life durations, respectively. Throughout, we used the scaling U(Death) = 0 
and H(FH) =1. 
Empirical support for multiplicativity was obtained by Miyamoto and Eraker (1988), 
Doctor et al. (2004), and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2004). A test of multiplicativity is obtained by 
comparing the answers to the PE questions for different gauge durations with each other and by 
comparing the answers to the PLE questions for different gauge durations with each other. 
Multiplicativity implies that, except for random response error, we should find the same 
probabilities p′ in the different PE questions and the same probabilities r′ in the different PLE 
questions.  
  To be able to compute H(Q) from the responses to the CE, VE, and VLE questions, we 
had to assume a specific form for L(T). We first assumed that L is linear in which case U(Q,T) is 
equal to the QALY model, the most widely used model in medical decision analysis. The first 
row of Table 2 shows how H(Q) was computed under expected utility with linear utility. The 
entries of Table 2 are derived in Appendix A. There is little empirical support for the assumption 
that utility is linear in life duration; an exception is the study by Doctor et al. (2004). We, 
therefore, subsequently assumed that L is a power function. The power function is often used in 
decision analysis and several studies have observed that it yields a good fit in the health domain 
(e.g. Pliskin et al. 1980, Miyamoto and Eraker 1985, Stiggelbout et al. 1994, Cher et al. 1997). 
The second row of Table 2 shows the effect on H(Q) of replacing the assumption of linear utility   11
by the assumption of power utility. The table shows that the PE and the PLE method are not 
affected by the choice of L. 
 
Table 2: Utilities under various assumptions 
 PE  CE  VE  PLE VLE 
EU-linear  p′  p′ 
T
Tce
   p′ 
Tve
T    r′
0.35  
Tvle
T   







































































































































































  We then dropped the assumption of expected utility and examined the impact of 
evaluating the five methods under prospect theory, rank-dependent utility, disappointment 
aversion, and the two gambling effect models assuming power utility for life duration for all   12
models. To operationalize Diecidue et al.’s (2004) model, we assumed that V(Q,T) = αU(Q,T). 
We also tried several other specifications, but this specification yielded the best fit among those 
that ensure that V(death) = 0. The benefits of certainty are positive when α > 1. This implies that 
utilities by the riskless-risk methods exceed those by the risk-risk methods. To operationalize the 
model of Bleichrodt and Schmidt (2002), we assumed that V(Q,T) = (U(Q,T))
α. We normalized U 
and V on [0,1] which implies that V is more concave than U when α < 1. This implies, in turn, 
that health state utilities by the riskless-risk methods exceed those by the risk-risk methods. The 
third row of Table 2 shows H(Q) under Diecidue et al.’s (2004) (DSW) model; the fourth row 
under Bleichrodt and Schmidt’s (2002) (BS) model.  
To be able to evaluate the methods under prospect theory we had to specify for each 
method the location of the reference point. Here we followed the suggestions of Hershey and 
Schoemaker (1985) and Bleichrodt et al (2001) and took (Q,T) as the reference point  in the PE 
and in the VE and either (FH,T) or Death in the CE. In the PLE we took either (FH,T), or (Q,T) 
or Death as the reference point. In the VLE, (FH,Tvle) is implausible as a reference point and we 
only analyzed the data for reference points (Q,T) or Death. The final row of Table 2 shows the 
utilities under prospect theory with the different reference points. To compute the probability 




  Subjects were sixty-five economics students (aged between 22 and 29) from the 
University of Murcia. They were paid €36 to participate in five experimental sessions, each 
lasting approximately one hour. In each experimental session a different method was elicited. The 
experiment was carried out in small group sessions with at most six subjects per group. The 
sessions were separated by at least one week. Prior to the actual experiment, the questionnaire   13
was tested in several pilot sessions using university staff as subjects.  
We elicited the utility of two health states. The health states were described through the 
EuroQol system, a widely used instrument to describe health states in medical research. The 
description of the health states is given in Table 3. Throughout the experiment, the health states 
were anonymously labeled as A and B to avoid framing bias.  Preferences were elicited through a 
sequence of choices. Empirical evidence suggests that choice-based procedures lead to more 
consistent data than matching procedures (Bostic et al., 1990). 
 
Table 3: The description of health states A and B 
Health state A  Health state B 
•  Some problems walking about 
•  Some problems performing self-care 
activities (e.g. eating, washing, 
dressing) 
•  No problems performing usual 
activities (e.g. work, study, family or 
leisure activities) 
•  Moderate pain or discomfort 
•  Moderately anxious or depressed 
•  Some problems walking about 
•  Some problems performing self-care 
activities (e.g. eating, washing, 
dressing) 
•  Unable to perform usual activities (e.g. 
work, study, family or leisure 
activities) 
•  Moderate pain or discomfort 




Recruitment of subjects took place one week before the actual experiment started. At the 
recruitment, subjects received information about the experiment and were asked to read the 
descriptions of the two health states. In addition, subjects were handed a practice question on the 
PE method. They were asked to answer this practice question at home. This procedure intended to 
familiarize subjects with the PE method. Prior to the start of the first experimental session, during 
which the PE method was administered, subjects were asked to explain their answer to the 
practice question. When we were not convinced that a subject understood the task, we explained   14
it again until we were convinced that he understood the task. The same procedure was repeated 
for each of the remaining experimental sessions. Subjects received a practice question to take 
home of the method that would be administered in the next session, and before the actual 
experiment started they had to explain their answer to the question.  
The order in which the methods were administered was: first session PE, second CE, third 
PLE, fourth VE, and fifth VLE. The experiment was part of a larger experiment. The presence of 
the other experimental tasks and the delay of at least one week between the sessions made it 
unlikely that subjects would recall their previous answers and would note the relationship 
between the sessions.
2 
At the beginning of each experimental session, instructions were read aloud and an 
additional practice question was given. We asked six questions per method by combining each 
health state (A and B) with three values for the gauge duration T: 13, 24, and 38 years. We used 
life durations substantially lower than subjects’ life-expectancy to avoid perception problems: 
subjects may find it hard to perceive living for very long durations which exceed their life-
expectancy. To avoid order effects, we varied the order in which the different questions were 
asked. So as to minimize response errors, subjects had to confirm the elicited indifference value 
after each question.  
We also determined, through a choice-based procedure, the life duration T′ that made a 
subject indifferent between T years in health state A and T′ years in full health, for T equal to 13, 
24, and 38 years. The same question was asked for health state B. These questions were included 
to test the appropriateness of assuming power utility for life duration. Under power utility, we 
should find that the ratio 
T′
T  is constant. Also, in the presence of multiplicativity, the condition 
that the ratio 
T′
T  is constant implies that the utility for life duration must be a power function   15
(Doctor and Miyamoto 2003).  These questions were asked in the second experimental session. 
 
Analysis 
As normality was rejected by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Lilliefors test, we tested 
significance of differences among the five methods by the nonparametric Friedman ranks sum 
test. When the hypothesis of equality was rejected by the Friedman test, we performed multiple 
pairwise comparisons by the Wilcoxon signed rank test to examine differences between each pair 
of methods. We used a significance level of 1% in the Wilcoxon tests to control for 
experimentwise Type I error, the phenomenon that when many tests on a given level are 
performed, some will be significant by coincidence (multiple significance testing). The Friedman 
test was also used to test for the appropriateness of assuming multiplicativity (p′ should be the 
same in the three PE questions and r′ should be the same in the three PLE questions) and the 
power function (
T′
T should be constant, see above).  
A distribution-free algorithm was used to determine the optimal values of the relevant 
parameters in the different theories. We started by setting the relevant parameter(s) equal to one 
and then we searched for the values of the parameters that minimized the sum of squared 
differences between the elicited utilities.
3 We varied β between 0.05 and 2, γ
+ and γ
− between 0.25 
and 2, λ between 0.25 and 4, δ between −1 and 10, α in Diecidue et al’s (2004) and in Bleichrodt 
and Schmidt’s (2002) gambling effect model between 0.05 and 2. Using wider bounds caused the 
program in some cases to choose extreme and implausible values so that all utilities were close to 
zero. The range of parameters used includes the estimates from the existing empirical literature. 
The optimal parameters were determined with an accuracy of 0.01. 
                                                                                                                                                   
2 An example of a PE question can be found on www.bmg.eur.nl/personal/bleichrodt/FormulationPE.pdf.  
The wording of the other questions was similar. 
3 To examine the sensitivity of the results to outliers, we also determined the parameters that minimized the 
sum of absolute differences. There were only small differences between the two sets of estimates.   16
6. Results 
  Two subjects were excluded from the analyses of health state A and 19 from the analyses 
of health state B, because their choices implied that they did not always prefer more life-years to 
less. This left 63 and 46 subjects in the analyses of health states A and B, respectively. More 
subjects had to be excluded for health state B, because B is a worse health state than A. The 
worse a health state, the more likely there is a duration for which subjects do not prefer additional 
life-years. The subjects who were excluded were those with the lowest utilities. The fact that 
more subjects were excluded for health state B than for health state A will not bias our 
conclusions, because these are not based on comparisons between the utilities for health states A 
and B. 
 
Table 4: Median responses. Interquartile ranges in square brackets. 
Health state A 
































Health state B 

































  Table 4 shows the median responses and in square brackets the interquartile range of the 
responses. The mean responses were similar to the medians. Because health state A is better than 
health state B, we should observe higher responses in the PE, VE, PLE, and VLE methods and   17
lower responses in the CE methods for health state A. All subjects satisfied this consistency 
requirement. Note that r′ was much lower than 0.35, so probability weighting could affect the 
PLE questions.  
Contrary to the predictions of expected utility, rank-dependent utility, disappointment 
aversion, and the two gambling effect models, we could reject equality of T, Tce, and Tve for both 
health states and for all three gauge durations (P < 0.01). The finding that Tce significantly 
exceeded T (P < 0.001 in all cases) is consistent under prospect theory with more risk aversion for 
mixed prospects. Contrary to prospect theory, we also found that Tve generally exceeded T with 
the exception of the second question for health state B. The difference was always significant for 
health state A (P < 0.001). For health state B the difference was marginally significant for the first 
and third question (P = 0.035 and P = 0.025) and not significant for the second question (P = 
0.650). 
  The tests of multiplicativity yielded mixed results. For both health states we could reject 
the hypothesis that the probabilities in the three PE questions were equal (P<0.01). However, we 
could not reject the hypothesis that the probabilities in the three PLE questions were equal 
(P=0.148 for health state A and P = 0.085 for health state B). The tests of the appropriateness of 
using power utility for life duration yielded positive results: for both health states we could not 
reject the hypothesis that the ratio 
T′
T  was constant (P = 0.565 for health state A, P = 0.085 for 
health state B). 
  Figure 1 shows the median utilities under expected utility with linear utility for life 
duration. For both health states and for all gauge durations we found significant differences 
between the five methods (P < 0.001 in all cases). The typical pattern was VE > PE > CE > PLE 
> VLE. The differences between PLE and VLE were, however, not significant. With few 
exceptions, all other paired differences were significant.    18
       The systematic differences between the methods could not be explained by the assumed 
linearity of the utility for life duration: Expected utility with power utility for life duration could 
not explain the results either. The first line of Table 5 shows the medians of the optimal power 
coefficients for each gauge duration and for each health state. Under expected utility with these 
optimal power coefficients, we could clearly reject the hypothesis that the five methods yield the 
same utilities (P < 0.001 for both health states and for all gauge durations). Contrary to expected 
utility with linear utility, all differences between PLE and VLE were significant. 
 



































  Table 5 also shows the optimal parameters for the other models we studied. The 
parameter estimate for α in Diecidue et al.’s (2004) gambling effect model exceeds one which 
indicates that the  benefit of certainty was positive and that the function V exceeded the function 
U. The finding that α < 1 in Bleichrodt and Schmidt’s (2002) gambling effect model implies, as 
expected, that in their model the function V was more concave than the function U. The obtained 
estimates suggest that the difference in concavity was substantial. We found a similar degree of 
probability weighting under rank-dependent utility as other studies using health outcomes 
(Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000). The estimates for Gul’s theory of disappointment aversion indicate   19
strong degrees of disappointment aversion. The final lines of Table 5 display the optimal 
parameter estimates for prospect theory where the reference point in the CE, PLE, and VLE 
methods is death. We also analyzed the data under the other possible reference points, but these 
did not lead to smaller differences between the methods and the convergence and fit at the 
individual level was far worse. Compared with other studies, we observed less probability 
weighting and comparable loss aversion. The findings on utility curvature varied with the theory 
examined: from strongly curved under expected utility and rank-dependent utility to moderately 
curved under prospect theory to slightly curved under the two gambling effect models to slightly 
convex (in four out of six cases) under disappointment aversion.  
 
Table 5: Parameter estimates 















EU-power model             
β  0.46 0.45 0.48 0.60 0.53 0.60 
Gambling-effect models             
Diecidue et al.             
α  1.26 1.56 1.56 1.53 1.55 1.66 
β  0.60 0.80 0.93 0.89 0.80 0.93 
Bleichrodt  &  Schmidt       
α
  0.68 0.48 0.43 0.64 0.58 0.55 
β  0.63 0.85 0.93 0.90 0.84 0.96 
Prospect Theory             
β  0.86 0.73 0.65 0.78 0.65 0.65 
λ  2.13 2.00 1.84 1.83 1.77 1.53 
γ
+  0.93 0.79 0.73 0.95 0.84 0.77 
γ
−  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.90 1.20 0.80 
Rank-dependent utility 
γ  0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.74 0.73 
β  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.53 0.60 
Disappointment av.        
δ  1.20 3.10 3.80 2.40 2.30 2.90 
β  0.84 1.03 1.15 1.10 0.91 1.14 
 
We also examined the data under prospect theory with the probability weighting and loss   20
aversion parameters obtained by Tversky and Kahneman (1992): γ
+ = 0.61, γ
− = 0.69, and λ = 
2.25. We analyzed this case because Bleichrodt et al. (2001) were able to remove all 
discrepancies between PE and  CE using Tversky and Kahneman’s values. 
None of the nonexpected utility theories could fully explain the data. The differences 
between the five methods were significant for all theories ( P < 0.01) except for health state B 
under prospect theory with the optimal parameters where the differences between the methods 
were only marginally significant (P = 0.040, P = 0.036, and P = 0.034 for gauge durations 13 
years, 24 years, and 38 years, respectively). 
 
Table 6: Number of Significant Pairwise Differences Between Methods 















EU-linear  7  7  9  6  7  8 
EU-power  model  9 8 9 6 6 7 
Diecidue  et  al.  7 7 6 5 5 4 
Bleichrodt  &  Schmidt  8 6 5 4 2 2 
Rank-Dep. Utility
  10 8  8  8  3  3 
Disappointment  Av.  6 7 7 6 5 4 
Prospect  Theory  TK  6 7 6 4 4 6 
Prospect  Theory  Opt.  3 4 4 1 2 1 
Note: Prospect Theory TK stands for Prospect Theory with the probability  
weighting and loss aversion parameters obtained by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
 
  Table 6 shows the number of significant pairwise differences between the five elicitation 
methods. For each gauge duration, there were 10 comparisons between methods. The table shows 
that using power utility instead of linear utility did not improve the performance of expected 
utility, that many differences remained significant under prospect theory with the probability 
weighting and loss aversion parameters obtained by Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
4, and that the 
number of significant differences was lowest under prospect theory with the optimal parameters. 
                                                 
4 Data in the Table are under linear utility for life duration. Similar data obtained when we allowed for 
curved utility for life duration.   21
The number of significant differences was also relatively low under Bleichrodt and Schmidt’s 
gambling effect model. 
 Figure  2
5 shows the results under prospect theory with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) 
values and linear utility for life duration. The figure shows that the main problem is that PLE was 
too high. As can be seen from Table 2, this problem cannot be solved by allowing for utility 
curvature because neither the PE nor the PLE are affected by the assumed form of the utility for 
life duration and, hence, their discrepancy will remain after correction for utility curvature. The 
difference between the PLE and the other methods can under prospect theory only be explained 
by a difference in the degree of probability weighting in our study as compared with Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). In particular, given that the response r′ in the PLE was generally between 0.10 
and 0.20, our data suggest less overweighting of probabilities in that range than suggested by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assuming that there is less probability weighting around 0.35.  
 
Figure 2: Median utilities under prospect theory with Tversky and Kahneman’s values and 



































                                                 
5 Figures for the other cases can be found on can be found on www.bmg.eur.nl/personal/bleichrodt/ 
ExtraFigures.pdf.   22
Figure 2 also shows that prospect theory could rather well explain the differences 
between the other four methods, except that for health state A the PE was too low. In these 
methods, the probabilities involved generally exceeded 0.35, suggesting comparable probability 
weighting in the range [0.35,1] as found by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The finding that CE 
generally exceeds PE is in contrast with Bleichrodt et al. (2001). The difference between PE and 
CE was significant for health state A and gauge durations 24 years and 38 years and for health 
state B and gauge duration 38 years. 
  Finally, Figure 3 shows the median utilities under prospect theory with the optimal 
parameters. In general the utilities were close; the exception is that for health state A the PE was 
too low. For health state B there seem to be no systematic differences between the five methods.  
 




































Our findings confirm that methods that according to expected utility are equivalent, 
produce systematically different results. The data suggest that evaluating riskless-risk methods by 
expected utility leads to utilities that are too high. Of the alternatives for expected utility that we   23
examined, no single model could explain the data entirely. The findings that under expected 
utility there was no significant difference between risk-risk methods (when the utility for duration 
is close to linear) and that the utilities obtained by riskless-risk methods were higher than those 
obtained by risk-risk methods agree with the predictions of the gambling effect models. The 
gambling effect models cannot, however, explain the systematic discrepancies between the 
riskless-risk methods. These discrepancies can be resolved by prospect theory, the theory that was 
most consistent with the data. The finding that the two risk-risk methods yielded comparable 
results under expected utility is, however, harder to reconcile with prospect theory. As we argued 
before, one explanation for this finding may be that there was little overweighting of small 
probabilities in our study. Anyway, our data seem to add to the evidence that violations of 
expected utility primarily occur when one of the prospects under evaluation is riskless. 
  That said, it may be too optimistic to assume that one single model could explain all data. 
After all, the number of deviations from expected utility that we considered was limited and other 
biases will most likely have affected people’s responses. In particular, we ignored the impact of 
scale compatibility, which predicts that the attention people devote to an attribute is higher as this 
attribute is more compatible with the response scale used (Tversky et al. 1988, Delquié 1993). 
Scale compatibility could explain for instance why Tve, the response to the VE question, generally 
exceeds T, a finding that none of the theories considered could explain. The reason we did not 
include scale compatibility was that its impact is ambiguous. For instance, in the PE method, 
where the probability p was determined that made a subject indifferent between the risky prospect 
(p:(FH,T); Death)) and the riskless prospect (Q,T), the response scale is probability and scale 
compatibility predicts that consequently people will focus on probability when evaluating 
prospects. However, people could either focus on the probability p of the good outcome full 
health or on the probability 1−p of the bad outcome Death and the direction of the bias due to 
scale compatibility depends on which probability people focus on.    24
  As noted before, we focused on health for reasons of practical relevance. A drawback of 
using health outcomes is that we had to assume multiplicativity to be able to compute utilities. 
We observed mixed evidence on multiplicativity. It should be noted that even when 
multiplicativity is violated we can still compare the PE utilities with the PLE utilities. In that case 
we compare the utilities U(Q,T) under PE and PLE rather than the utilities H(Q). Our conclusions 
were not affected when we only compared the PE with the PLE. Thus the assumption of 
multiplicativity does not seem to be critical in the findings of our study. 
To operationalize prospect theory, we had to make assumptions about the location of the 
reference point. Empirical evidence seems to support our assumptions about the location of the 
reference point in the riskless-risk methods. No evidence exists about the location of the reference 
point in the risk-risk questions. Here we extended the arguments of Hershey and Schoemaker 
(1985) and Bleichrodt et al. (2001). Possibly, however, the formation of a reference point is more 
complicated when both prospects are risky. For example, people may take a risky prospect as 
their reference point rather than a single outcome. It might be that in the PLE method, where the 
probability r was determined that made a subject indifferent between the risky prospects (r: 
(FH,T); Death)) and (p: (Q,T); Death)), the reference point for the best outcome of the prospects 
was (Q,T), but for the worst outcomes it was Death. It is not clear how to cover such a situation. 
In particular, it is not clear how to model probability weighting when the reference point is a risky 
prospect. Sugden (2003) presented an extension when people do not weight probabilities. 
  The use of students as subjects may limit the generalizability of our findings. Empirical 
evidence on health utility measurement has suggested, however, that there are no systematic 
differences in the patterns of responses obtained using convenience samples and those obtained 
using representative samples from the general population. For a review see de Wit et al. (2000). 
Because we elicited preferences over health, the outcomes in our study had to be 
hypothetical. Several studies have addressed the question whether response patterns differ 
between questions with hypothetical outcomes and questions with real outcomes; see Hertwig and   25
Ortmann (2001) for an extensive review. These studies used moderate monetary amounts as 
outcomes. The general conclusion from these studies is that the effect of real incentives varies 
across decision tasks. For the kind of tasks that we asked our subjects to perform, there appears to 
be no systematic difference in the general pattern of responses, although real incentives tend to 
reduce data variability.  
The order in which the five methods were administered was fixed. We found no evidence 
that this affected the results. For example, the standard deviations of individual responses in the 
VE were comparable to those in the CE even though VE was administered in a later session. This 
finding contradicts the hypothesis that people became more aware of their true preferences over 
the sessions leading to lower response error. Also, we found no evidence that people behaved 
more in agreement with expected utility in later sessions, contradicting the hypothesis that more 
experience with choosing between prospects may lead to fewer violations of expected utility.  
  Let us finally discuss the implications of our research for practical decision analysis. Our 
findings suggest that the common practice in medical decision analysis to measure utilities under 
risk by probability equivalence or certainty equivalence methods and to evaluate the responses by 
expected utility will lead to biased utilities; our data suggest that this bias is upwards. Instead, 
riskless-risk methods, like the probability equivalence and certainty equivalence methods, should 
be evaluated through prospect theory. For riskless-risk methods, the parameters found by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) performed well. A possible alternative for using riskless-risk methods and 
prospect theory may be to use risk-risk methods and expected utility. We found no 
inconsistencies when evaluating risk-risk methods by expected utility. As we argued, this can be 
explained by the virtual absence of overweighting of probabilities in the interval [0.10, 0.20]. To 
what extent our findings can be generalized to other stimuli and outcome domains remains an 
open question. The preliminary findings in McCord and deNeufville (1986) for money agree with 
our findings, which gives some confidence that comparable findings may be obtained for other 
stimuli and outcome domains.   26
  
Appendix: Derivation of the formulas in Table 2. 
  Throughout we assume multiplicativity and power utility for life duration U(Q,T) = 
H(Q)T
β and we use the scaling H(FH) = 1 and U(Death) = 0. In Bleichrodt and Schmidt’s (2002) 
gambling effect model, we need to normalize utilities on [0,1]. Hence, we set L(38) =1 in that 
model. Expected utility with linear utility is the special case of expected utility with power utility 
where β = 1. Disappointment aversion is the special case of rank-dependent utility where w
+(p) = 
p
1+(1−p)δ .  
 
PE method 
  The indifference (Q,T) ~ ((FH,T), p′; Death) yields under expected utility H(Q)T
β = p′T
β 
or H(Q) = p′. Under Diecidue et al.’s (2004) gambling effect model, we obtain α(H(Q)T
β) = p′T
β. 
Rearranging gives H(Q) = 
p′





α, or H(Q) = (p′)





 H(Q) = w
+(p). Under prospect theory, (3) yields H(Q)T

















The indifference (Q,Tce) ~ ((FH,T), p′; Death) yields under expected utility H(Q)T
β
ce = p′T 




β. Under Diecidue et al.’s (2004) gambling effect model, we obtain 
α(H(Q)Tce
β) = p′T






β.  Bleichrodt and Schmidt’s (2002)   27



















β. The same expression holds 




ce − T 
β) = T 
β − λw
−(1−p)(−T 









The indifference (Q,T) ~ ((FH,Tve), p′; Death) yields under expected utility H(Q)T
β = p′ 
T
β
ve and thus H(Q) = p′(
Tve
T  )
β. Under Diecidue et al.’s (2004) gambling effect model, we obtain 
α(H(Q)T
β) = p′ Tve





β. Bleichrodt and Schmidt’s (2002) 














ve, or H(Q) = p′(
Tve
T  )
β. Prospect theory with reference 
point (Q,T) gives by (3), H(Q)T



















The indifference ((Q,T), 0.35; Death) ~ ((FH,T), r′; Death) yields under expected utility 
0.35H(Q)T
β = r′T
β, or H(Q) = 
r′
0.35 . The two gambling effect models agree with expected utility 









+(0.35) .  Prospect theory with reference point Death is identical to rank-dependent utility. If 
the reference point is (Q,T), (3) and (5) give H(Q)T 
β−λw
−(0.65) H(Q)T 
β = H(Q)T 
β + w










−(0.65)) . If the 

















The indifference ((Q,T), 0.35; Death) ~ ((FH,Tvle), 0.35; Death) yields under expected 
utility 0.35H(Q)T
β = 0.35 T
β
vle, or H(Q) = (
Tvle
T  )
β.The two gambling effect models agree with 





β or H(Q) = (
Tvle
T  )
β. The same expression holds for prospect theory with reference 











β). Deleting common terms and rearranging 
gives H(Q) = (
Tvle
T  )
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